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97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019)

NEGOTIATING THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT’S COMPLIANCE WITH COURT
ORDERS: AN INITIAL EXPLORATION*
NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO**
Judicial review of federal agencies rests on the premise that if a
court gives an order to an agency, the agency will obey. Yet the
federal government’s compliance with court orders is far from
automatic, especially with orders telling an agency to act
affirmatively, which may strain limited agency resources,
interfere with the agency’s other legally required tasks, or force
the agency to act on deficient information. An agency may
invoke these difficulties to convince a judge that it should be cut
more slack—that is, given more latitude (especially more time) to
comply. Judges often find the agency’s difficulties to be quite real
and hold back from demanding strict and rapid compliance.
Thus, whether an agency must actually do what a court has
ordered, and on what terms, entails a delicate negotiation
between agency, judge, and plaintiff. These compliance
negotiations, despite their great practical importance, are little
analyzed or understood in the academic literature, for it is
difficult to learn about them through traditional sources like
appellate case law. This Essay, drawing upon a large cache of
dockets from district court cases in which compliance troubles
arose, provides an initial exploration of this unexplored subject.
This Essay finds that the central problem in these cases is the
judge’s access (or lack of access) to information about why the
agency is falling short and whether it could do more. On this
theme, this Essay discusses (1) the kind of information that an
agency can provide about its own internal management so as to
* © 2019 Nicholas R. Parrillo.
** Professor of Law, Yale Law School. This Essay benefited from discussion at the
roundtable and subsequent conference titled “Beyond Deference: Emerging Issues in
Judicial Review of Agency Action” at the Center for the Study of the Administrative
State, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University. I particularly thank the
commentators on the piece, William Buzbee and Andrew Grossman. The body of cases on
which the Essay draws for its primary evidence was compiled as part of a separate project
that was sponsored by the Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund at Yale Law School. I am indebted
to several Yale Law School student research assistants for identifying cases relevant to the
Essay’s focus: José Argueta Funes, Katie Choi, Samir Doshi, Julia Hu, Christine Smith,
and Isra Syed. All errors are my own.
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convince the judge that it is trying hard enough to comply; (2) the
imperfect and even crude methods that judges use to discern
whether an agency is trying hard enough; and (3) the ways in
which judges can employ information-gathering techniques, such
as requiring testimony by high agency officials, as quasi
sanctions to force the agency to pay more attention to what the
court has ordered.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative law as a field focuses mainly on judicial review of
agency action. Such review rests on the premise that if a court gives
an order to an agency, the agency will obey. Yet the federal
government’s compliance with court orders is far from automatic.
Compliance can become a problem when a court holds agency action
unlawful and sets it aside, for example, when district judges found
that the Obama Administration disobeyed injunctions against
prohibiting offshore oil drilling1 and against shielding aliens from
deportation.2 But compliance problems are even more common when
the challenge is to agency inaction, that is, when the court is telling
the agency to act affirmatively—something we see not uncommonly
in areas like environmental law, natural resource management, and
freedom of information. When a judicial order tells an agency to act
affirmatively, it can strain limited agency funding and personnel,

1. Hornbeck Offshore Servs., LLC v. Salazar, No. 10-1663, 2011 WL 454802, at *3
(E.D. La. Feb. 2, 2011), rev’d, 713 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2013).
2. Order at 1–2, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00254 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2015),
ECF No. 281.
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disrupt the agency’s ordering of its priorities (potentially interfering
with other tasks the agency is legally required to carry out), or force
the agency to act on technical or scientific knowledge that is deficient.
There is substantial literature on how a court, in deciding
whether to issue an order compelling agency action in the first place,
should anticipate and weigh these problems,3 but the decision to issue
such an order is often just the beginning of the story. The court,
exercising its equitable discretion, has to decide the terms of the
injunction. Should it simply order the required action all in one piece,
letting the agency decide the details, or should it break the action into
steps and order them individually, effectively micromanaging the
agency? Should the court attach deadlines to the action, to the steps
that constitute the action, or both, or should it instead trust the
agency to get everything done in a more or less “reasonable” time?
And there’s more: even when the order spells out specifics and is
sharpened by deadlines, agencies have been known to come back to
court asking for extensions, warning that, unless the judge cuts the
agency some slack, the action will be rushed and therefore
dangerously ill-conceived or the agency’s other tasks will be
dangerously neglected. A judge must then ask herself: does the
bureaucracy really deserve more latitude on this, or am I being
suckered into excusing the agency’s incompetence, or worse, its
political aversion to doing what the law requires?4 Thus, a plaintiff
may “win” a suit to compel agency action only to find that victory
opens up a fraught and complex negotiation over the terms and
timing of obedience that may go on for years.
We know far too little about how these compliance negotiations
work. Despite their significance for the efficacy of judicial review,

3. This literature includes Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in
Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1 (2008); Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin:
Judicial Review of Administrative Agency Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461
(2008); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness
Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657 (2004); Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell,
Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 923 (2008); Michael D.
Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial
and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381
(2011); Glen Staszewski, The Federal Inaction Commission, 59 EMORY L.J. 369 (2009);
and Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When Agencies Defer
Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157 (2014).
4. For commentary on the legitimate role of a judge’s equitable discretion in
deciding the terms and timing on which federal agencies must carry out statutorily
required actions, see the classic statement in Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc. v.
Train, 510 F.2d 692, 711–14 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
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there is very little academic literature on them.5 A major reason for
this inattention, I believe, is that while compliance negotiations are
bound by doctrine in certain ways, there is not a doctrine of
compliance negotiations per se. To learn about these negotiations,
one cannot rely mainly on traditional sources like appellate case law.
The negotiations are a matter of case management and the evidence
of them (if they leave any accessible written record at all) is in orders
and various party filings—usually of district courts—that never get
enshrined in published reports.
In a recent article,6 I sought to address one key question about
compliance negotiations: what is the endgame? That is, if the judge
5. Admittedly, there are a few specific case studies of individual agency initiatives
that shed light on compliance negotiations. See generally MARC K. LANDY, MARC J.
ROBERTS & STEPHEN R. THOMAS, THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
ASKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS FROM NIXON TO CLINTON 89–132 (expanded ed. 1994)
(describing EPA rulemaking under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act);
ROSEMARY O’LEARY, ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE EPA
23–46, 95–116 (1993) (detailing instances of EPA rulemaking under the Clean Water and
Clean Air Acts); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judge Lamberth’s Reign of Terror at the
Department of Interior, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 235 (2004) (describing the challenge to Interior
Department management of Native American trust accounts); David C. Vladeck,
Unreasonable Delay, Unreasonable Intervention: The Battle to Force Regulation of
Ethylene Oxide, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 191 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006)
(reviewing OSHA rulemaking related to ethylene oxide). It should also be noted that,
although the question of remedies in administrative law has long been neglected, there has
been a welcome proliferation of scholarship on the question very recently, albeit focused
on what remedies to grant in the first place, not how to obtain compliance with remedies
that have been granted. See generally Nicholas Bagley, Remedial Restraint in
Administrative Law, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 253 (2017) (contending that courts should use
context-specific remedies instead of invalidating agency actions automatically); Samuel L.
Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417
(2017) (advocating against the use of nationwide injunctions to restrain the enforcement of
administrative action); Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1065 (2018) (defending the use of nationwide injunctions in at least some cases);
Michael T. Morley, Nationwide Injunctions, Rule 23(b)(2), and the Remedial Powers of the
Lower Courts, 97 B.U. L. REV. 615 (2017) (discussing the scope of a district court’s power
to issue a nationwide injunction and outlining situations when such an injunction might be
appropriate); Joshua Revesz, Voluntary Remands: A Critical Reassessment, 70 ADMIN. L.
REV. 361 (2018) (arguing that courts should be much more reluctant to grant voluntary
remands); Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (2017)
(exploring when courts issue nationwide injunctions and when such relief is appropriate);
Christopher J. Walker, Response, Against Remedial Restraint in Administrative Law, 117
COLUM. L. REV. ONLINE 106 (2017) (suggesting that the ordinary remand rule currently
in place is preferable to a more context-specific remedial approach); Christopher J.
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1553 (2014) (exploring how the ordinary remand rule works in
practice and the degree to which it promotes the separation of powers doctrine it was
meant to uphold).
6. Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685 (2018).
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refuses to credit the agency’s assertion that resource limitations or
technical-knowledge deficiencies make compliance infeasible and
slack necessary, what happens? Can the judge make the agency
swallow its objections and forge ahead? In litigation against private
parties, the answer would be yes: the judge can find a disobedient
defendant in contempt and impose sanctions of fines or imprisonment
to force action.7 But does contempt work against federal agencies?
Because there is very little appellate doctrine on this point, my
research team and I conducted broad searches of the Westlaw
database for relevant judicial opinions, including especially those of
district courts, and of the Bloomberg Law database for relevant
dockets.8 We located about eighty suits in which a federal agency was
held in contempt, plus another 150 judicial opinions with discussion of
interest, plus over one thousand other dockets in which a contempt
motion against an agency was made but denied. From this source
base, my conclusion was that contempt mostly does work against
federal agencies, but in a different way than it works against private
defendants. Judges certainly do issue contempt findings against
agencies—as they do against private defendants—but sanctions
against agencies involve far greater legal and prudential
complications than against private defendants. Several judges think
they can impose sanctions on agencies and have tried to do so, but the
higher courts have demonstrated near-complete unwillingness to
allow sanctions, even as they bend over backward to avoid making
pronouncements that sanctions are categorically unavailable against
the government.9 Crucially, however, contempt findings in
themselves—despite the judiciary’s evident unwillingness to couple
them with sanctions—have a shaming effect on agency officials and
their counsel that gives them very substantial, if imperfect, deterrent
power.10 A finding of contempt is damaging to the reputations of
federal agencies and officials, and the historical norm has been for
them to work hard to avoid such a finding.11
Whereas my previous article focuses on extreme cases in which
litigation reaches a finding of contempt, this Essay aims to explore the
more common and ordinary compliance negotiations that occur in the
7. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (2012) (codifying the contempt power of the federal
courts).
8. For a complete description of the research, see generally Appendix: Methodology
for Locating Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685 app. (2018), https://harvardlawreview.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/01/685appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/9E99-TVZA].
9. Parrillo, supra note 6, at 704–64.
10. Id. at 770–89.
11. Id.
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shadow of a judge’s power to threaten contempt. I draw upon orders,
briefs, and other filings from the assembly of suits that my team and I
previously collected for the article on contempt, but this time focus
more on the suits in which a contempt finding was sought by the
plaintiff and/or considered by the judge but not actually made.12 This
is the result in a large majority of cases. Admittedly, a full
examination of the subject of compliance negotiations would have to
take account of court-party and interparty interactions that are never
recorded in filings—a kind of research that would likely require
interviews with practitioners, litigants, and judges. That is a worthy
endeavor for future research. For now, I believe there is much to be
learned from the large cache of documentary sources that my team
and I examined.
Drawing upon those sources, this Essay provides an initial
exploration of how compliance negotiations work. A major theme, on
which I focus, is the judge’s access to information. By threatening a
contempt finding with its attendant reputational damage, a judge
knows that she can cause agency officials to act even though they say
they lack the technical knowledge or resources to do so. But should
the judge do this? This largely turns on what she knows. How does
the court tell the difference between an agency whose delay is a

12. Specifically, this Essay is largely based on a body of approximately 1400 docket
sheets in the Bloomberg Law database of U.S. district court actions from about 1990 to
2015. In each of these actions, a plaintiff moved for contempt against a federal agency, or a
contempt proceeding was initiated by the judge, but no contempt finding was ultimately
made. On the process by which this body of approximately 1400 docket sheets was
originally assembled for the earlier article, see Appendix: Methodology for Locating Cases,
supra note 8, at 5–10 (describing two major searches of the Bloomberg Law database,
resulting respectively in 440 and 997 docket sheets involving contempt proceedings against
the federal government, which together—minus the small number in which contempt
findings were actually made—comprise the body of cases examined for the present Essay).
For this Essay, my research assistants went over the approximately 1400 docket sheets to
find those in which the possibility of contempt received serious attention from the agency
and/or the judge. They focused especially on those in which the judge asked for, or the
agency furnished, new information about the agency’s compliance, or efforts at
compliance, or in which the judge and agency communicated about timelines or deadlines
for compliance. For cases involving such attention, the research assistants forwarded to me
PDFs of the filings most relevant to the compliance issues. While the Bloomberg Law
database has PDFs of virtually all filings going back to about 2005, it has PDFs for only
some filings going back to about 2000, and almost none from before 2000. Therefore, the
research assistants were able to find and forward PDFs only for cases from about 2000 to
2015. Ultimately, they forwarded to me PDFs from approximately 200 docket sheets, all of
which I examined. (In the course of the research, I decided not to include in my analysis
suits by federal inmates because I believe such suits usually present a distinct set of issues;
midway through the research, I asked the research assistants to stop forwarding filings
from such cases. This exclusion did not apply to civil immigration detainees.)
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reasonable reaction to technical-knowledge deficiencies or resource
limitations, on the one hand, and an agency that is unreasonably lazy,
inefficient, or politically recalcitrant, on the other? This judgment
requires knowing something about (1) the agency’s internal
management and capacities, (2) the many tasks competing for the
agency’s attention, (3) the political pressures that bear upon the
agency, and (4) the level of technical knowledge that is requisite for
the agency to make sound decisions. For the most part, these are not
the types of information that judges are traditionally suited to acquire
and process.13 Indeed, they are even different from the types of
information that judges must process when they engage in a “hard
look” review of the merits of a technical agency decision.14 Types (1),
(2), and (3) are in the nature of organizational and political
information—less analogous to the paradigm of hard look review and
more analogous to the paradigm of “structural reform litigation” that
is more familiar in the history of civil rights suits against states and
localities than in federal administrative law.15 And while type (4) is
13. Cf. R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE
CLEAN AIR ACT 388 (1983) (arguing that measures to increase the technical and scientific
expertise of judges are “misguided” because “what the courts need most is a better
understanding of administrative issues, not technical ones,” mainly because better
administrative understanding would lead to more efficacious remedies). For a discussion
on the peculiar nature of the information necessary to decide a challenge to federal agency
inaction, see RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 12.3, at 1068–
69 (5th ed. 2010) (“[I]n deciding whether to grant relief [for agency delay] a court must
focus not on the detail of the agency’s method of proceeding with respect to the particular
matter, but rather on a broad assessment of the temporal urgency of that matter in
comparison with the temporal urgency of the scores, hundreds, or even thousands of other
matters for which the agency has decisionmaking responsibility. . . . It is often easy to paint
a picture of apparent irresponsible delay by focusing only on the manner in which an
agency has handled a particular matter. It is much more difficult to demonstrate that delay
of a particular matter is ‘unreasonable’ when the inquiry focuses instead on the agency’s
total workload and its scarce resources available to accomplish all of the important tasks it
has been assigned.”).
14. See, e.g., Nat’l Lime Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 416, 451 n.126 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
15. For some major treatments of structural reform litigation from diverse
perspectives, see generally MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL
POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S
PRISONS (1998) (exploring the courts’ role in reforming the prison system and arguing that
the modern administrative state requires an active judiciary); ROSS SANDLER & DAVID
SCHOENBROD, DEMOCRACY BY DECREE: WHAT HAPPENS WHEN COURTS RUN
GOVERNMENT (2003) (arguing for limits on the availability, scope, and duration of
judicial decrees against the government); Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term—
Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979) (explaining the nature,
importance, and risks of structural reform litigation); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M.
Feeley, Judicial Policy Making and Litigation Against the Government, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 617 (2003) (arguing that judges have succeeded as policymakers and that judicial
policymaking is subject to effective self-imposed restraints); Charles F. Sabel & William
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related to technical knowledge, it really goes to the metaquestion of
when the acquisition of knowledge ceases to be cost justified, which is
not purely a technical inquiry but also a prudential and managerial
one.16
This Essay explores several aspects of the judge’s informational
challenge. Part I explains that litigation over compliance is a world
apart from garden-variety judicial review of agency action in that
judges in garden-variety suits are accustomed to relying upon the
record compiled by the agency itself, whereas in compliance disputes
the court itself often needs to find facts in the first instance. And
while discovery against the agency is a possibility for extreme cases,
courts much more typically employ methods that fall short of fullblown adversary testing, such as sworn statements submitted by
officials on a formally voluntary basis or required status reports. Part
II analyzes a typical example of an official’s sworn statement
explaining the agency’s noncompliance. Usually the official can satisfy
the judge with a facially plausible description of the agency’s
operations and challenges, even if the official asks the judge to take
much on faith. Given that these sworn statements and status reports
are the judge’s usual sources of information, Part III asks how judges
practically decide whether an agency is making sufficient efforts or
must be forced to do more. The methods that judges use in this
inquiry are often fairly crude, for example, demanding that the
agency keep up its current pace of work without interrogating
whether that pace is unreasonably slow to begin with, or using as a
benchmark the agency’s time to complete some prior action without
much inquiry into whether the present action is comparable. Crude as
they are, these methods may be the best courts can devise. Part IV
explains that judges—knowing they are dependent on officials for
information about what efforts agencies are making and whether they
practically could do more—consider it crucial that officials act and
communicate in good faith. Thus, what most disturbs judges—and
H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 1016 (2004) (describing a trend toward experimentalist approaches in public
litigation and reframing such litigation as involving “destabilization rights”); Margo
Schlanger, Civil Rights Injunctions over Time: A Case Study of Jail and Prison Court
Orders, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 550 (2006) (suggesting that court orders governing prison and
jail conditions have not decreased and offering suggestions for further research); and
David Zaring, National Rulemaking Through Trial Courts: The Big Case and Institutional
Reform, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1015 (2004) (exploring the ways in which institutional reform
lawsuits spread uniform practices across the country).
16. See Jacob Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Thin Rationality Review, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1355, 1389–91 (2016).
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what most reliably spurs them to attack the agency with threats like
contempt—is if the agency appears to manipulate information in a
way that is opportunistic or misleading. Agencies that give this
appearance, even inadvertently, need to win back the judge’s trust. To
do so, they may need to increase their transparency beyond ordinary
expectations. Finally, Part V considers how courts’ more aggressive
and unusual means of gathering facts about agency compliance
efforts, such as allowing top officials to be deposed or forcing them to
attend judicial proceedings in person, can serve not only to inform the
court but also to get the attention of the agency’s top management,
acting as a quasi sanction akin to a contempt threat.
I. HOW JUDGES GET INFORMATION ABOUT AGENCY COMPLIANCE
EFFORTS
At the outset, we must recognize that litigation over an agency’s
failure to comply with an affirmative court order—consisting of
motions to modify the order, to enforce the judgment, for contempt,
etc.—fits uneasily with judges’ usual approach to getting information
when reviewing federal agencies. In this part, I review the usual
approach judges use to gather information from agencies in cases
involving the judicial review of agency action and explain why this
particular kind of litigation fits awkwardly into that usual approach.
A “general rule of administrative law,” known as the “record
rule,” says that “a court can engage in judicial review of an agency
action based only on consideration of the record amassed at the
agency.”17 The “record” that an agency amasses regarding its own
action (assuming the action did not result from a formal proceeding
that produces an obvious record) consists of “all materials considered
by responsible agency staff members,”18 which the agency assembles
and certifies to the court.19 If the record produced by the agency is
17. PIERCE, supra note 13, § 11.6, at 1047.
18. Michael Asimow & Yoav Dotan, Open and Closed Judicial Review of Agency
Action: The Conflicting U.S. and Israeli Approaches, 64 AM. J. COMP. L. 521, 527 (2016).
Asimow and Dotan are referring to informal adjudications rather than informal
rulemakings, see id., but their language is an apt statement of the thinking for both kinds
of action, see Daniel J. Rohlf, Avoiding the ‘Bare Record’: Safeguarding Meaningful
Judicial Review of Federal Agency Action, 35 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 575, 583 (2009) (stating
that, for all types of informal action, “a complete administrative record includes
information that was directly or indirectly considered by the relevant agency,” even if the
information did not actually pass before the eyes of the agency’s final decisionmaking
official).
19. Exactly what materials the agency should include in the record and forward to the
court in the case of informal action—particularly when large numbers of personnel and
amounts of material are involved—is a question that is often unclear in the case law,
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insufficient for the court to conduct a meaningful review, the
appropriate course is for the matter to “be remanded to the agency to
reconsider the case.”20 It is not for the court to inquire de novo into
how the agency made its decision. “The focal point for judicial review
[of agency action] should be the administrative record already in
existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing
court.”21 Because the agency record is “virtually the sole evidence a
court will consider,” “plaintiffs in almost all cases cannot take
advantage of traditional discovery tools to seek additional documents
or information, including the testimony of officials involved in the
decision at issue.”22 To be sure, the case law has recognized
circumstances in which a court can allow the agency record to be
completed or supplemented,23 including if the challengers make “a
strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior” on the part of the
agency.24 When new evidence is allowed, the court can obtain it by
“allow[ing] discovery by plaintiffs” or by directly “order[ing] agencies
to add materials to the record.”25 But these circumstances are
disputed in litigation, and subject to numerous judgment calls that depend on practices
that vary by agency and are sometimes quite ad hoc (e.g., whether or when officials’
personal notes should be included). See Rohlf, supra note 18, at 582–602; see also Asimow
& Dotan, supra note 18, at 529–31; Aram A. Gavoor & Steven A. Platt, Administrative
Records and the Courts, 67 KAN. L. REV. 1, 8–14 (2018); James N. Saul, Comment, Overly
Restrictive Administrative Records and the Frustration of Judicial Review, 38 ENVTL. L.
1301, 1311–14 (2008). To a large degree, agencies are on their honor. See Rohlf, supra note
18, at 602–08. Some but not all of the confusion over the boundaries of the record arises
from questions about the deliberative process privilege (though material subject to this
privilege should arguably be placed within the record but then withheld while being noted
in an index). Gavoor & Platt, supra, at 35–39 (noting a circuit split on whether deliberative
process material is part of the record to begin with); see also Rohlf, supra note 18, at 584,
591–97; Saul, supra, at 1323–29. On the EPA’s internal policy regarding what goes in the
record, see Carrie Wehling, EPA’s Administrative Records Guidance, ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Summer 2017, at 16, 16. The Administrative Conference of the United States
recently adopted a recommendation regarding compilation of records for informal
rulemaking. Administrative Conference Recommendation 2013–4: The Administrative
Record in Informal Rulemaking, 78 Fed. Reg. 41,352, 41,358–59 (July 10, 2013); see also
LELAND E. BECK, AGENCY PRACTICES AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
RECORDS IN INFORMAL RULEMAKING 80–82 (2013), https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/Agency%20Practices%20and%20Judicial%20Review%20of%20Adminis
trative%20Records%20in%20Informal%20Rulemaking.pdf [https://perma.cc/C3G9-JLD5]
(outlining recommendations for compiling records based on a survey of agency practices).
20. Asimow & Dotan, supra note 18, at 533.
21. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985) (alteration in original)
(quoting Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973)).
22. Rohlf, supra note 18, at 578.
23. Id. at 587–91; Saul, supra note 19, at 1319–23.
24. Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971), abrogated
on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
25. Rohlf, supra note 18, at 586.
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exceptional; courts “typically reject” any attempt to introduce
evidence beyond the record submitted by the agency.26
With this background in mind, the unique challenges of litigation
over agency compliance are evident. Such litigation is, to a large
degree, a fact-gathering exercise, and potentially a daunting one. If
the agency is claiming that its noncompliance is excusable or that it
deserves more slack, the court may want to find out what progress the
agency has made toward compliance, what resources the agency has
allocated to compliance, whether those resources could be used more
efficiently, what other priorities are competing for those resources,
how much additional agency effort would increase the soundness of
the decision, whether the agency has ulterior (e.g., political) motives
for noncompliance, and what the consequences of delay are for the
challengers and the public. The documents potentially relevant to
these inquiries range widely; they are potentially more diverse and
dispersed than those that would relate to a discrete agency
rulemaking or adjudication. Further, the most relevant information
might not be documentary at all but instead lie in officials’ unwritten
deliberations on, for example, how to staff various projects.
Faced with these fact-gathering challenges, the court may find
there is no agency record at all, or at least not an adequate one.
Though the point is not very clearly articulated in the case law, a few
commentators have briefly noted that challenges to agency inaction
exist in a world apart from the record rule.27 When the agency has not
acted, there often is no agency record, or if there is a record (e.g., if
the agency seriously considered taking action but then demurred), it
is often incomplete.28 In these situations the court may end up doing
fact gathering of its own since it may seem futile to remand to the
agency to compile or complete a record of the agency’s own
inaction.29 Postjudgment noncompliance is a type of inaction, and, as
we shall see, it is not unusual for courts in that context to gather facts
26. Asimow & Dotan, supra note 18, at 534; see also Rohlf, supra note 18, at 585.
27. See Thomas O. Sargentich, The Jurisdiction of Federal Courts in Administrative
Cases: Developments, 41 ADMIN. L. REV. 201, 239–42, 242 n.156 (1989); Steven Stark &
Sarah Wald, Setting No Records: The Failed Attempts to Limit the Record in Review of
Administrative Action, 36 ADMIN. L. REV. 333, 350–51 (1984); Debmallo Shayon Ghosh,
Note, “Inquiries That We Are Ill-Equipped to Judge”: Factfinding in Appellate Court
Review of Agency Rulemaking, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1269, 1282–83 (2015) (noting that,
especially in cases of agency inaction, the court has no record to examine and so must look
to other circumstances and facts).
28. See Sargentich, supra note 27, at 239–42, 242 n.156; Stark & Wald, supra note 27,
at 350–51; Ghosh, supra note 27, at 1282–83.
29. Sargentich, supra note 27, at 239–42, 242 n.156; Stark & Wald, supra note 27, at
350–51, 353–54; Ghosh, supra note 27, at 1282–83.

97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019)

910

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

beyond any record submitted by the agency. This can go as far as
allowing discovery30 but it can also be something less formal, such as
the judge ordering periodic status reports or the agency submitting
declarations from officials on a formally voluntary basis.
But while first-instance fact gathering and even discovery can
occur in compliance litigation, fact gathering against the federal
government nonetheless remains a comparatively exceptional and
unfamiliar enterprise for federal judges.31 That may well color judges’
sense of how aggressive they ought to be in doing it. And even if a
federal agency is subjected to discovery, there are formal limits on it
that the federal government uniquely enjoys, most notably the
deliberative process privilege that protects communications among
federal officials about how to make decisions—a privilege not
enjoyed by state or local government litigants in federal court.32 While
judges evaluating compliance by federal agencies face a task similar
to structural reform litigation against state or local entities, they do
not have the same visibility into the institutions they are trying to
influence.
II. HOW AGENCIES PRESENT FACTS TO EXCUSE THEIR
NONCOMPLIANCE: AN EXAMPLE
With this context in mind, we can now consider the kinds of facts
that an agency presents to a judge about its compliance efforts in the
30. Discovery in a challenge to inaction can be made without any prior showing about
bad faith, see, e.g., Vladeck, supra note 5, at 199 & n.24 (describing discovery in the 1981
challenge to OSHA’s inaction in regulating ethylene oxide), although one can find cases in
which discovery is allowed only after a showing of bad faith, see, e.g., Tummino v. Von
Eschenbach, 427 F. Supp. 2d 212, 230–32 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
31. I should qualify this by acknowledging that litigation to redress unlawful official
action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) or under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), is not confined to
an administrative record in the way judicial review under the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”) model normally is. But FTCA and Bivens suits serve a distinct function: they
are largely confined to careless or rogue behavior by lower-level officials, as distinct from
the more policy-laden judgments that are made by agencies as institutions. These policyladen judgments are the province of APA-type review, which is the focus of this Essay.
The distinct function of the FTCA is evident from its exception for “discretionary”
functions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012); PIERCE, supra note 13, § 19.4, at 1818–41. The
distinct function of Bivens is evident from the Supreme Court’s vehement refusal to allow
it to be used to challenge agency policy formulation. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843,
1859–61 (2017).
32. See 2 DAVID M. GREENWALD, ROBERT R. STAUFER & ERIN R. SCHRANTZ,
TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGES § 9:13, at 612–13 (2012 ed. 2012). On the increasing
importance of this privilege, see Michael Ray Harris, Standing in the Way of Judicial
Review: Assertion of the Deliberative Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
349, 393–96 (2009).
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hope of getting its noncompliance excused. For a sense of these kinds
of facts, take an example from an environmentalists’ suit under the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The Fish and Wildlife Service
(“FWS”) had listed five plant species as threatened or endangered
but determined that it was “not prudent” to make the otherwiserequired designations of critical habitat for those species.33
Environmentalists challenged these determinations, and a district
judge found them unlawful.34 Questions then arose as to (1) how long
the agency should have to reconsider the determinations and (2) in
the event the agency found designations to be prudent (which was
likely), how long it should have to actually make the designations.35
For these tasks, the agency asked for sixteen and twelve months,
respectively, while the plaintiffs asked for two and four.36 The judge
roughly split the difference with only brief discussion of agency
capacities, granting the agency nine months to reconsider the
determinations and eight months to make the designations, should it
find them prudent.37 After the agency departed from its earlier
determinations and did indeed find it prudent to designate habitats,
its eight months to make the designations began ticking down. With
one week left on the clock, the agency rushed back to court,
announced it would not meet the deadline, and asked for an
extension of another eight months.38 The agency said the delay was
due mainly to its decision to acquiesce in the recent opinion of
another circuit calling for more elaborate methods of economic
analysis, plus some unexpected information arising from public
comments on the proposed designations.39 Plaintiff opposed the eightmonth extension request but said it was okay to let the agency have
another three months.40 It moved for contempt, seeking a tighter
injunction in the interim that would operate much like a series of
33. Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary
Judgment and Denying Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment and Voluntary
Remand at 3–4, Cal. Native Plant Soc’y v. Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP (S.D. Cal. May
1, 2001), ECF No. 27.
34. Id. at 4–5.
35. See id. at 6–8.
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id. at 6–8.
38. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Partially Amend Order
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) at 2, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 41.
39. Second Declaration of Gary Frazer at 2–5, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF
No. 42.
40. Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to
Amend Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt at 1, Berg, No. 3:00cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 44.
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instantaneous critical-habitat designations.41 In response, the agency
said it could speed things up; it projected it could meet the threemonth timeline, though it opposed a tighter injunction.42
In opposing the contempt motion and defending its lateness, the
agency submitted a declaration from Gary Frazer, the FWS’s
Assistant Director for Endangered Species, explaining that the
agency was going as fast as a court could reasonably ask.43 The agency
had not been ordered to submit this declaration, nor had any
discovery been allowed. But it was in the agency’s best interest to
submit the document to ward off a contempt finding for missing the
deadline. It is worth examining excerpts from this declaration as an
example of how an agency presents itself as doing triage between
competing legal mandates and balancing speed with decisional
soundness:
The Service has struggled in recent years to complete listing
and critical habitat actions within statutorily prescribed time
frames, consistent with the procedural requirements of the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) and the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), while laboring under continued budget
shortfalls. . . . The Service’s priorities for completing ESA
Section 4 listing activities are now most often set by Court
order. . . .
The Service recognizes that the deadline for the plants’
designations has elapsed, and that the Service has requested an
extension of the deadline . . . . Therefore, the Service has
undertaken extraordinary efforts to expedite completion of the
final designation for these plants. . . .
The [Carlsbad Fish and Wildlife Office (“CFWO)”] was able to
review, categorize, and analyze all of the public comment letters
received during the second comment period [on the
designations], draft responses to all 120 public comment letters
received during both comment periods, and complete the rule
[designating critical habitat] within three weeks. The CFWO
completed this process nine to ten weeks earlier than originally
estimated by reassigning a number of ongoing projects within
the CFWO, and by recruiting help from senior staff within
41. Id.
42. Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt at 1, 10, Berg, No.
3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 50.
43. Third Declaration of Gary Frazer ¶ 2, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No.
50.
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CFWO, the Washington, DC office, and economic consultants
to respond to public comments. This assistance cut into the
supervisory duties of the senior staff biologist as well as the
time he has had to devote to coordinating and writing several
other rules with imminent court-ordered deadlines. This redirection of duties has resulted in internal delays for completing
these other rules. Further, both primary staff and the senior
staff were required to put in a significant number of overtime
hours to complete this task. The Service did not arrive at the
decision to reassign workloads easily, because the extraordinary
time and effort devoted to this rule has compromised the
Service’s ability to meet other listing rules, and may result in
the Service seeking additional time to complete other courtordered deadlines. . . .
Finally, to expedite the review process at Regional and
National levels, the rule is being reviewed simultaneously at
several levels [i.e., the field office, regional office, and DC
office]. . . . The Service estimates that [simultaneous review] . . .
trimmed approximately 2 ½ months off of the review process. It
is normally not advisable nor practical to review rulemakings in
this manner; the review process is made more cumbersome and
difficult, it is more expensive, and by expediting the review
process for the plants, internal review of several other rules
were delayed.44
This declaration is granular enough to support a facially plausible
claim that the FWS is moving as fast as it reasonably can, though it
still asks the judge to accept many agency judgments on faith. The
relevant tradeoffs are all identified in a qualitative way, but while
elements of a few of the tradeoffs are quantified (e.g., “trimmed
approximately 2 ½ months”), most are not (e.g., “several other rules,”
“significant number of overtime hours,” “may result in the Service
seeking additional time”). And, of course, none of the assertions and
prudential judgments in the declaration were subject to adversary
examination that might have forced the agency to flesh out its
thinking; the judge had not allowed depositions or scheduled livehearing testimony. This moderate level of bureaucratic self-disclosure
was apparently enough to satisfy the judge.45
44. Id. ¶¶ 2, 5, 8–9 (citations omitted).
45. The judge had scheduled hearings on the extension request and on contempt near
the end of the three-month proposed extension period. He then held both motions moot
when the FWS did, in fact, get the rule out within three months. See Order Denying As
Moot Defendants’ Motion to Partially Amend Order and Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
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III. JUDGES’ TOOLS FOR GAUGING WHAT THEY CAN REASONABLY
DEMAND OF AGENCIES
Given this informational base (i.e., voluntary declarations and
status reports, with a possibility of discovery), judges evaluating
agency compliance have to decide what level of bureaucratic effort
they think is required. In compliance proceedings, we see a good deal
of dialogue and disputation over whether the agency is adhering to its
promised rate of progress toward completion of the ordered task. But
it is much less clear how or whether judges are deciding what rate of
progress is reasonable to begin with.
For many tasks that courts order agencies to complete, progress
can be easily measured, or, at least, the task can be defined in a way
that allows measurement. At the outset, the court will order the
agency to keep to some kind of schedule, which it often bases on a
proposal from the agency. If the overall task is comprised of a large
number of small acts that each require approximately the same effort
(e.g., a class of claims to decide or a mass of pages to process under
the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”)), the court can issue an
order, or simply set an expectation, that the agency will complete
these acts at a certain rate, to be checked by periodic status reports.
In this way, the court can tell if the agency is slowing down, in which
case it may demand that the agency either get back on pace or explain
itself.46 Though this method can pose problems—for example, if the
small individual acts are not actually uniform in the level of effort
required47—it is often workable.
And even if the outputs of an administrative process are not easy
to measure, the inputs may be.48 If the agency has been devoting a
Contempt at 5–6, Berg, No. 3:00-cv-01207-L-LSP, ECF No. 54. Were he upset about the
disobedience, he easily could have scheduled an earlier contempt hearing.
46. This is what happened in a class action challenging the U.S. Department of
Veterans Affairs’ processing of Agent Orange disability benefit claims. Nehmer v. U.S.
Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, 2007 WL 1795707, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal.
June 19, 2007); Order Re CLL Claims Procedure at 1–2, Nehmer, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH,
ECF No. 404. In FOIA litigation, page-per-time-period schedules are common. See, e.g.,
Order at 3, Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:12-cv-00333-GK
(D.D.C. Oct. 16, 2012), ECF No. 25.
47. See, e.g., January 2003 Status Report at 2, Loudner v. United States, No. 4:94-cv04294-LLP (D.S.D. Jan. 2, 2003), ECF No. 245 (noting that, in the Bureau of Indian
Affairs’ processing of applications for distributions from the Mississippi Sioux Judgment
Fund, the last set of applications were “single cases” that did “not allow the batch
processing by family groups” like previous ones, slowing the pace).
48. Performance Measurement Challenges and Strategies, OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET
(June 18, 2003), https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/performance/challenges_
strategies.html [https://perma.cc/N28R-BD85]; see also JAMES Q. WILSON,
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certain level of staffing or funding to compliance, the judge can
monitor that and, if it diminishes, press the agency to restore it.49
Relatedly, judges discussing an agency’s appropriations may say that,
if the agency’s funding is increasing, its speed should as well.50 While
input-focused approaches to administration can be criticized for
ignoring whether inputs produce bang for the buck, they are better
than nothing.
Of course, an agency action subject to a court order may not
break down naturally into a large number of relatively uniform small
acts—for example, a complex rulemaking. But a rulemaking can be
broken down into a series of unique steps, each with a mini-deadline
attached, and the judge can monitor whether the agency is meeting
each mini-deadline. A court may tell an agency to do a rulemaking
and then, when compliance problems arise, impose a deadline for
completion of the whole task, plus mini-deadlines along the way,
along with more frequent progress reports.51
But really, all these judicial maneuvers beg further questions. A
judge can tell if an agency is falling short of its promised or historical
monthly rate of progress, but how does the judge know if that rate is
reasonable to begin with? A judge who decides the agency should
complete a rulemaking in X months can subdivide that time period
into the various steps of rulemaking, but how does the judge know if
X is a reasonable number of months in the first place? In my research
I do not see judges interrogating these questions very aggressively.
Rather, I see judges adopt a monthly claims-processing rate or a
rulemaking time span based on the agency’s historical practice,52 or
BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 154–71
(1989).
49. See, e.g., Amended Order at 2, Loudner, No. 4:94-cv-04294-LLP, ECF No. 241
(criticizing the agency for having no plan to replace an employee working on the ordered
task who is leaving).
50. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife v. Norton, Civil Action No. 00–2996 (GK), 2004 WL
6243361, at *4 & n.5 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2004) (finding, conditional on the matter being
remanded to the district court, that it is warranted to move from a nondeadline order to a
deadline order for a rulemaking in part because the agency’s appropriation for such
activity has increased); Amended Order at 2, Loudner, No. 4:94-cv-04294-LLP, ECF No.
241 (warning agency managers they are “not far” from a contempt proceeding and
criticizing them for not allocating the increased resources they enjoy to the ordered task).
51. See, e.g., Defs. of Wildlife, 2004 WL 6243361, at *5; Order at 3, Ctr. for Biological
Diversity v. Norton, No. 4:01-cv-00409-DCB (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2003), ECF No. 121.
52. This is what happened in the Nehmer litigation cited above. See supra note 46 and
accompanying text. The historical baseline may take the form of a periodic rate of
adjudications completed, as in Nehmer, Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No.
3:86-cv-06160-TEH, 2007 WL 1795707, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2007), or an amount of
time per adjudication, as in Minard Run Oil Co. v. U.S. Forest Service, C.A. No. 09–125
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the agency’s own proposal,53 or by splitting the difference between the
agency’s proposal and that of the challengers,54 or by making
comparisons to prior court orders involving the same general type of
agency proceeding—with little attention to whether the prior
proceedings are practically comparable to the one at bar, or whether
the prior orders were optimal.55
In other words, judges often make no attempt to optimize; they
satisfice.56 They seek not the best answer but merely an acceptable
one. Rather than directly analyze the agency’s organizational
capacities and competing priorities to pinpoint some reasonable level
of performance, they pick a performance level in a more or less
arbitrary manner, like those described above. If that arbitrarily
chosen performance level does not seem obviously unreasonable, the
judge adopts it and gets the agency to stick with it unless a plausible
argument arises for not doing so.
This approach has its problems. For the judge to rely upon the
agency’s proposal may introduce pro-agency bias. For the judge to
split the difference may risk an order that is likewise biased toward
the agency, or, conversely, overly stringent on the agency, potentially
with perverse results—not to mention that splitting the difference
invites both parties to be strategic in their proposals. For the judge to
rely upon a historical baseline is workable only if the ordered task is
comparable to something the agency has done in the past. There may
not be a comparable past action, or at least, not one the parties agree
to be comparable.
One might argue that the satisficing approach, with all its
problems, is inevitable given the limits of judicial competence and of

Erie, 2012 WL 994641, at *6–7 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 23, 2012) (construing a prior order to
require the Forest Service to process drilling proposals at a speed equal to a historical
baseline but holding that the challengers had not yet shown the agency’s current activity to
be below that baseline).
53. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
54. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 35–37.
55. In ordering FWS to designate a critical habitat for four species of fairy shrimp and
eleven species of vernal pool plants, a court concluded that “the six-month extension
proposed by plaintiff is more than reasonable” in part because “other district courts have
imposed deadlines far less generous.” Memorandum and Order at 16, Butte Envtl.
Council v. White, No. 2:00-cv-00797-WBS-GGH (E.D. Cal. Sept. 25, 2002), ECF No. 73.
To this point, the court cited other cases that imposed shorter deadlines but pertained to
apparently unrelated species with no discussion of whether the time and effort necessary
to designate critical habitat for those other species would be comparable. Id. at 16–17.
56. On the concept of satisficing, see HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR 118–20 (4th ed. 1997).
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the resources judges have to process information. It is often said that
courts should be reticent to question agencies on the technical or
scientific merits of an action, given that expertise on such matters is
concentrated in the agency, not the court.57 Information is probably
even more concentrated in the agency when the topic is the agency’s
own internal organizational capabilities. Still, the agency does not
have a total monopoly, and a judge can at least occasionally find
alternative sources of information to serve as a basis for questioning
the agency’s assertions about what it can feasibly do.
One source consists of formal officials who have exited the
“revolving door” from agency employment to extragovernmental
advocacy. Consider a suit by environmentalists during the Reagan
Administration to force the EPA to complete several rulemakings on
emissions of nitrogen oxides. The EPA claimed it needed four years,
submitting a declaration from the head of its Office of Air Quality
Planning and Standards saying the time was necessary given the
complexity of the task.58 Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from David
Hawkins, who, during the Carter Administration, had been Assistant
Administrator for Air, Noise, and Radiation (i.e., the position directly
above that held by the government’s declarant).59 Hawkins cited
rulemakings from his own tenure that took far less than four years yet
were, he said, of comparable complexity to the ones at issue.60 The
judge was persuaded, relying heavily on Hawkins’s declaration in
rejecting the EPA’s four-year proposal in favor of two years.61
Hawkins was not merely a credible witness on the science of air
quality; he was a credible witness on the EPA’s organizational
capacity to deal with various levels of complexity within the science of
air quality.62 He was an expert not only in the EPA’s subject matter
but on the EPA as an institution. That said, I have not found other

57. See, e.g., Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 895 F.3d 90, 100–01
(D.C. Cir. 2018).
58. Sierra Club v. Thomas, 658 F. Supp. 165, 172 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 172–75. The agency did complete the rulemaking in time. Emily Hammond
Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 1770
(2011). The rule was then challenged on the grounds that it was insufficiently reasoned,
held unlawful, and remanded without vacatur. Id. at 1770–71. The EPA then failed to fix
the problems with the rule brought out by the second challenge for another fifteen years.
Id. at 1771–72.
62. See Sierra Club, 658 F. Supp. at 172.

97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019)

918

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97

examples of onetime officials popping up to question their former
agencies’ assertions about what is doable.63
Further, the question of what an agency can do depends not only
on hard-to-discern organizational capacities but also on the level of
resistance it can expect from various stakeholders—a factor that may
be even more obscure to judicial eyes. Consider a suit by
environmentalists claiming that operators of equestrian campgrounds
in the Shawnee National Forest were required to seek permits from,
and submit to regulation by, the U.S. Forest Service (“USFS” or
“Forest Service”). The court enjoined the USFS to complete review
of pending permit applications within a certain time period.64 But
some operators were doubtful that the law required them to apply for
permits and, depending on how the negotiation of permit terms
worked out, might opt to continue to do business without permits,
presumably inviting enforcement and litigation.65 Faced with this
delicate situation, the USFS took longer than expected to process the
applications. When plaintiffs grew impatient and moved for
contempt, the agency—while contending that it was compliant with
the injunction rightly read66—admitted that “[t]he delay in permit
issuance is regrettable”67 and that “[t]he Forest Service has
encountered unexpected hurdles in permit processing, and it has
taken extra time to overcome them.”68 The USFS said it felt the need
to proceed deliberately in a manner that would get stakeholders to
accept regulation:
The Forest Service has struggled to maintain a positive
relationship with anxious equestrian campground operators
who have never before been subject to this type of regulation
. . . . Determining which campgrounds require a permit and
under what terms required careful planning and forethought,
given the potential for further litigation. Under these unusual
circumstances, permit issuance was more than a ministerial
act.69

63. That such declarations, if offered, would often be from former political appointees
of a prior administration of the political party opposing the one in power might diminish
their credibility.
64. Order and Injunction at 2, Glisson v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG
(S.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 2003), ECF No. 63.
65. See Federal Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff-Intervenor Wallace’s Motion for
Contempt and Sanctions at 8–14, Glisson, No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG, ECF No. 78.
66. Id. at 3–4, 3 n.3.
67. Id. at 16.
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 12.
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One might interpret the agency’s approach as evidence that it was
captured by the operators (as indeed the plaintiffs did),70 but
alternatively, one might view it as a sensible means for a resourcelimited agency to induce regulated parties to engage in voluntary
compliance with the permitting scheme and avoid the costs of
adversary enforcement or litigation,71 or even the cost of
congressional retaliation.72 Ultimately the judge denied the plaintiff’s
motion for contempt,73 saying the officials faced a “difficult situation
and had probably done as good a job as they could have done under
the circumstances.”74 Admittedly, it is unusual for an agency to
invoke stakeholder resistance so explicitly as the USFS did here, but
such considerations must inform any realistic understanding of what
an agency can practically do. And yet it is not clear how a court can
second-guess an agency’s assessment of a matter like this.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE COURT’S TRUST IN
THE AGENCY
We have seen that in compliance litigation the court is dependent
on the government in a couple of ways. First, judges’ usual means of
obtaining information about the agency’s progress and capabilities
consist of declarations or status reports from agency officials without
adversary testing built-in as it would be in a deposition or live
testimony. Second, judges’ sometimes-crude methods of gauging what
the agency can do often depend on the agency’s own proposal, either

70. Id. at 13–14 (noting plaintiff’s allegation that campgrounds “have unduly
influenced the Forest Service”).
71. See id. at 11 (“The Forest Service has sought to maintain an amicable business
relationship with the applicants and in good faith has recently met with them on a monthly
basis to hear their concerns. The Forest Service is hopeful that most, if not all, applicants
will quickly sign their permits. However, since some equestrian campgrounds do not
believe that their operation requires a special use permit, the Forest Service is also
determined to respond to equestrian campground outfitters who may ultimately refuse to
sign a permit.” (citations omitted)); id. at 13 (“The Forest Service has patiently dealt with
the hesitant equestrian campground operators to alleviate their concerns and is ready to
respond if permits are not signed.”).
72. The agency suggested this obliquely by mentioning communications from
Representative John Shimkus regarding “the permits that were sent to the campgrounds.”
Id. at 11 n.13. Representative Shimkus’s district includes much of Shawnee National
Forest. See Our District, CONGRESSMAN JOHN SHIMKUS, https://shimkus.house.gov/
about/our-district [https://perma.cc/Y2FK-JY82].
73. Minutes of Court at 1, Glisson, No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG, ECF No. 86.
74. Federal Defendants’ Response to Plaintiff-Intervenors’ Motion for Contempt and
Sanctions at 4, Glisson, No. 4:99-cv-04189-JPG, ECF No. 131 (alterations in original)
(internal citation omitted) (quoting judge’s oral remarks from a prior hearing).
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as the sole basis for a compliance schedule or as one half of a
difference-splitting exercise.
Given these dependencies, judges consider it crucial that they be
able to trust the agency, both to convey truthfully the organizational
realities inside the bureaucracy and to make a good faith effort at
compliance. This is especially true if the challengers have accused the
agency of bad faith (i.e., political resistance to obeying the order). In
that case, the agency’s trustworthiness is the very crux of the
litigation.
In light of this, judges react very badly if they suspect the agency
is engaged in bad-faith noncompliance or is misleading them about
compliance efforts. Conversely, agency lawyers are well advised to
provide information in a manner that projects the agency’s good faith:
be candid about the agency’s efforts to comply and its progress
toward compliance, anticipate when those efforts may come up short
and warn the court early, and be explicit about any noncompliance
that does occur and provide a transparent description and explanation
of it to head off any inference of bad faith or political recalcitrance.
A striking example of an agency not heeding this advice,
resulting in a judicial eruption, is a lawsuit in the District of Montana
by environmentalists against the USFS, claiming that the agency’s use
of chemical fire retardant violated the National Environmental Policy
Act (“NEPA”) and the ESA. District Judge Donald Molloy held that
NEPA and the ESA were both applicable to the USFS’s general
policies regarding the use of fire retardant, and he enjoined the
agency to comply with both statutes accordingly, including an
obligation to engage in formal consultation regarding endangered
species with the FWS.75 The USFS asked for thirty months to comply,
but Judge Molloy said eighteen was enough.76 In doing so, he candidly
recognized the inexactness of any given time frame and admitted the
eighteen-month schedule might have to be adjusted; he just wanted
the agency to keep the parties informed and allow reasonable time for
renegotiation.77 Addressing agency counsel, he said:
I don’t think . . . 30 months is a reasonable time. . . . I’m going to
require that there be NEPA compliance within 18 months of
75. Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 397 F. Supp. 2d 1241,
1257 (D. Mont. 2005).
76. Docket Entry 100, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM
(“USFS requests 30 months; Court will require NEPA compliance within 18 months of
today’s date.”).
77. See Order at 2, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM,
ECF No. 130.
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today’s date. Now, I’ll do that with the caveat that so long as
there is some warning ahead of time, if, at a year [from now] or
whatever is the appropriate time, you don’t think you’re going
to be able to hit the target, you give notice to the plaintiffs. My
suggestion would be that before you ask for more time, you
discuss it with the plaintiffs and the interveners. And if there’s a
way that can be resolved without the Court involving itself,
then I am happy to accept whatever you agree on. But I think
you can get it done in 18 months. And if you are going to come
in with a controversy, I hope it’s not at 17 months and 29 days.78
As it turned out, the agency did find itself unable to meet the
deadline and did ask for more time—exactly seventeen months and
twenty-nine days later.79 Because the failure to meet the deadline was
announced suddenly and inadequately explained, Judge Molloy
suspected political recalcitrance.80 He granted a two-month extension,
but he also scheduled a contempt hearing in the event that the agency
was, in the judge’s words, “prevented from following the law by its
political masters” and thus missed the extended deadline.81 “[I]t
seems as if the government is playing a not too funny game, betting
that the Court will be forced to grant the additional time and hoping
the irony of the timing will be overlooked,” he wrote.82 Having been
granted the extension, the agency then got itself in further trouble by
missing the extended deadline.83 The day after missing that deadline,
it issued a hasty finding that no Environmental Impact Statement was
required under NEPA.84 The finding included an unusual disclaimer
that the USFS’s still-incomplete consultations with the FWS might
alter the finding in the future.85 Judge Molloy then scheduled a
78. Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting judge’s oral remarks from a prior hearing).
79. Id.
80. See id. at 3.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 2.
83. See FSEEE’s Reply Brief in Support of Its Motion for Contempt at 1, Forest Serv.
Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 139 (noting “the Forest
Service . . . failed to complete either an environmental impact statement or a finding of no
significant impact (FONSI) by the Court’s deadline, in violation of NEPA’s required
form”).
84. Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Contempt at 5–6, Forest Serv. Emps. for
Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 137; see also FSEEE’s Reply Brief in
Support of Its Motion for Contempt at 2, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv00165-OWM, ECF No. 139 (describing the Forest Service’s filing as “hastily-prepared”
and “signed . . . a day after the Court’s deadline for compliance”).
85. Defendant’s Opposition to Motion for Contempt at 5–6 & nn.2–3, Forest Serv.
Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 137. On the fact that such
disclaimers are unusual in such a finding, see Transcript of Hearing on Motion for
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contempt hearing, which he said would give the agency “the
opportunity to dispel the Court’s inclination to hold it in contempt of
court.”86 As a shot across the bow, he told the agency to brief the
question of whether its top official, Undersecretary of Agriculture
Mark Rey, should be incarcerated for contempt.87
From this low point, the agency recovered. Eight days prior to
the contempt hearing, the USFS issued a revised (and much longer)
finding that no Environmental Impact Statement was required,
having at last completed consultation with the FWS.88 The revised
finding adopted new precautions in the use of fire retardants that the
FWS was now recommending.89 At the contempt hearing itself, the
USFS and the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) took the
extraordinary step of bringing Undersecretary Rey and five U.S.
Department of Agriculture career officials to Missoula, Montana, to
testify for two afternoons, explaining in extreme detail the internal
bureaucratic bungling that led to the big delay. “We take the gravity
of your last order to heart,” the DOJ attorney told Judge Molloy,
“and we’re basically an open file today and throughout the remainder
of these proceedings.”90 The USFS-FWS consultation, said the
witnesses, had been so drawn out because of miscommunication and
misunderstanding between the two agencies regarding the fire
retardant program, which caused them to grossly underestimate how
many species had to be evaluated.91 In such an operation, the role of a
Contempt at 59, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review). I had this transcript produced using a grant from
Yale Law School’s Oscar M. Ruebhausen Fund. The hearing was held February 26–27,
2008, and is noted in two docket entries, ECF Nos. 155 and 156.
86. Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1126,
1135 (D. Mont. 2008).
87. Id. at 1136.
88. See Defendant’s Notice of Completion of Consultation and Further Decision
Notice and Finding of No Significant Impact at 1, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl. Ethics, No.
9:03-cv-00165-OWM, ECF No. 150 (describing the revision of the initial finding and filing
the revised version with the court); ABIGAIL KIMBALL, U.S. FOREST SERV., DECISION
NOTICE & FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT: AERIAL APPLICATION OF FIRE
RETARDANT 2 (2008), https://www.fs.fed.us/sites/default/files/ media_wysiwyg/wcfs_
aerial_application_of_fire_retardant.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7AX-6BR4] (noting the
differences between the initial and revised findings).
89. KIMBALL, supra note 88, at 2–3.
90. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Contempt at 10, Forest Serv. Emps. for Envtl.
Ethics, No. 9:03-cv-00165-OWM.
91. See id. at 52–53, 63, 84–86, 88, 94, 100 (recording testimony that describes the
misunderstanding); id. at 19, 32, 37, 88 (recording testimony noting particularly the
agencies’ inaccurate initial understanding of the scope of the work). One witness admitted
that the USFS inadvertently failed to give the FWS certain information it needed. Id. at
151–52.

97 N.C. L. REV. 899 (2019)

2019]

COMPLIANCE WITH COURT ORDERS

923

high official like Rey was to ensure that officials who actually
formulated findings and decisions had the resources they needed, and
all officials testified that they received all the resources they
requested and were never discouraged from complying with the law.92
The agency’s ultimate compliance and its openness about its
mistakes mollified Judge Molloy. He acknowledged that
Undersecretary Rey was “not in charge of the day-to-day activities of
what goes on.”93 Further, he seemed to concede that his initial
attribution of politicized bad faith to the agency had been wrong,
though he made the important point that the agency invited this
attribution because of its initial failure to be forthcoming with
information about compliance problems:
THE COURT: I have been doing this [i.e., judging] for 12
years, and I know the difficulties that your agencies have. I do
feel you may not think that, but I do understand that.
And I think that if the rule of law is to abide by what we all
want it to be, I have to follow the law, I have to rely on the
lawyers to tell me, when I say, “look, I think that’s too much
time, but I understand there might be some problems. Just
don’t come in here at the last minute on the last day and tell me
there’s a problem. Give us a heads-up.”
And that didn’t happen. And—
THE WITNESS [UNDERSECRETARY REY]: And for that,
we apologize.
THE COURT: . . . [W]ell, maybe you should talk to your
lawyers and tell them that if you’re having those kinds of
difficulties, information really helps. I mean, if we practice in the
dark, then we maybe draw conclusions that are not warranted.
But I anticipated that there might be some of these problems. It
was why I said [at the initial hearing on the compliance
schedule]: “Look, if you’re having problems, let me know about
it.”
And I didn’t get any word until, ironically, when I said, “don’t
come in here on . . . the 17 months and 29 days,” and that’s
exactly when [the extension request] came in, was almost like,
92. See id. at 81, 120 (recording testimony indicating that the agency provided all the
requested resources necessary for compliance); id. at 34, 62–63, 75, 94, 110, 121 (recording
testimony by agency officials that they did not discourage compliance and by agency
employees that they were not discouraged from complying).
93. Id. at 227.
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you know, it was—one could read it to have been more than
ironic.94
In other cases, too, we observe the importance of government
lawyers disclosing information in a manner that projects agency good
faith. In a major class action suit against the Interior Department for
mismanaging Native American trust accounts, Judge Royce
Lamberth had an extraordinary series of confrontations with the
government, holding contempt trials of two successive Interior
Secretaries in 1998 and 2002 and finding them both liable. The
troubles began when the government failed to comply with certain
discovery orders because of problems in the agency’s informationmanagement system, problems that, Judge Lamberth believed, the
agency concealed from the court.95 In a challenge to the Department
of Veterans’ Affairs’ processing of claims related to Agent Orange,
the government initially made itself vulnerable to similar trouble
when it failed to explain a slowdown in the processing rate, leading
the judge to suspect bad faith and issue a show-cause order.96 The
government then recovered by pinpointing the reason for the
slowdown (a miscommunication between headquarters and a field
office about how many employees the latter was to assign to
processing), reporting it in detail to the court, and volunteering to be
subjected to more fine-grained reporting requirements going forward
about the rate of processing and the resources devoted thereto.97
Again, transparency is the currency of good faith, as the Department
of Veterans Affairs was able to avoid a contempt finding.98
94. Id. at 37–38 (emphasis added). At the end of the hearing, Judge Molloy said he
believed all the witnesses were sincere, but he criticized the agency, its personnel, and its
lawyers for their level of competence and for not taking responsibility. Id. at 226, 229.
95. This is noted in the order and opinion at the end of the first contempt trial. Cobell
v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 13 (D.D.C. 1999). For the second contempt finding, see Cobell
v. Norton, 226 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002), rev’d, 334 F.3d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 2003). The D.C.
Circuit later removed Judge Lamberth from the case on the ground that he had become so
biased against the government that he could no longer be impartial—a remarkable finding
that normally occurs only if a judge engages in “improper outside communications,” of
which Lamberth never made any. Cobell v. Kempthorne, 455 F.3d 317, 331, 335 (D.C. Cir.
2006).
96. See Nehmer v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, 2007 WL
1795707, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. June 19, 2007).
97. Defendants’ Response to the Court’s Order to Show Cause Why Defendants
Should Not Be Held in Contempt at 10–12, Nehmer, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, ECF No.
408.
98. See Order Vacating Hearing and Status Conference and Discharging the Order to
Show Cause, Nehmer, No. 3:86-cv-06160-TEH, ECF No. 442. Another example of how
agencies benefit from being transparent can be seen in a suit against the Department of
Defense (“DOD”) for unlawful inoculations of service members against anthrax. The case
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V. INFORMATION GATHERING AS A QUASI SANCTION TO GET THE
AGENCY’S ATTENTION
So far, we have focused on information as the basis for courts’
decisions about what to order the agency to do. Once the court has
decided the agency should do a certain thing, the official “stick” to
incentivize the agency to do that thing is the threat of a contempt
finding, with its attendant reputational damage. It is the contempt
threat, often directed at the head of the agency, that grabs the
attention of that official and, therefore, of the official’s subordinates.
But information gathering itself can serve a purpose similar to
that of contempt, operating unofficially as a quasi sanction—an
unpleasant thing that grabs the attention of officials. For example,
reporting requirements, if they become frequent and burdensome
enough, can serve this purpose. In one instance, a court made an
agency report to the plaintiff on its progress every day for an eightmonth period.99 Another example is the appointment of a special
master, which, though rare against federal defendants,100 can make
officials’ lives much more difficult, taking away their autonomy and
privacy.
Perhaps the most striking example is a judicial attempt to allow a
high agency official to be deposed or to force such an official to testify
in court. Any high official is busy, and having to testify is disruptive
because of the time necessary to attend the deposition or court
proceeding, to travel (if it is a court proceeding outside Washington,
D.C.), and, most importantly, to prepare—the official almost certainly
knows nothing about the case except perhaps short briefings, so

resulted in a worldwide injunction against the inoculations, which had been given at the
rate of thousands per day. Defendant’s Response to Order to Show Cause at 4–6, John
Doe #1 v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:03-cv-00707-EGS (D.D.C. Feb. 28, 2005), ECF No. 69; see also
Lee Black, Informed Consent in the Military: The Anthrax Vaccination Case, 9 VIRTUAL
MENTOR 698, 700–01 (2007) (recounting the history of the vaccination program and the
resulting case). Upon learning that some inoculations had occurred after the injunction
had issued, the DOD rapidly disclosed this fact. Response to the Court’s Minute Order at
1–3, John Doe #1, No. 1:03-cv-00707-EGS, ECF No. 65. When the court nonetheless issued
an order to show cause, the DOD gave a detailed narrative (based on two declarations and
several exhibits from the director of the Military Vaccine Agency) of how it had
communicated the court’s order to all parts of the military, how it was tracking any
inoculations that still occurred, and what it was doing to stop them (plus plans to send
letters of apology to all persons erroneously inoculated). Defendant’s Response to Order
to Show Cause at 4–22, John Doe #1, No. 1:03-cv-00707-EGS, ECF No. 69.
99. Coal. of Ariz./N.M. Ctys. for Stable Econ. Growth v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior,
100 F.3d 837, 839, 841 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting the trial court’s action).
100. See, e.g., Trentadue v. CIA, No. 2:08–CV–0788, 2015 WL 1968263, at *5 (D. Utah
Apr. 30, 2015) (appointing a special master to monitor agency noncompliance).
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getting up to speed takes hours or days. And there is the risk of
embarrassment and adverse consequences if the official, questioned
by the challenger or judge, is caught saying something ignorant or
makes some unwarranted concession. Given all this, the threat of
being deposed or made to appear in court can be an effective
attention-getting device. The effect may be to get the high official to
do what is within his or her power to appease the judge into backing
off, such as allocating more agency resources to the court-ordered
task. At the same time, the threat has incentive effects on the lowerlevel officials and attorneys who have more direct involvement with
compliance: they do not want to be the ones held responsible for
subjecting the boss to inconvenience and embarrassment.
But while making high officials testify might be effective in
getting the agency’s attention, appellate courts have been extremely
averse to the idea (just as they are averse to contempt sanctions). The
prudential concern is obvious: such demands for testimony, if
multiplied, could rapidly take up huge amounts of high officials’ time,
crippling agency management.101 Further, appellate judges have a
ready theory for why high officials need not testify. The conceit of
demanding such testimony is that the court needs information from
the target official, but high officials usually do not know much about
compliance with any particular court order, so there is almost always
some lower-level official who could give better information.102 In
recent decades, the federal courts of appeals have repeatedly granted
writs of mandamus to stop district courts from allowing depositions
of, or subpoenas to, high federal agency officials.103 Indeed, my

101. See, e.g., In re United States, 624 F.3d 1368, 1373–74 (11th Cir. 2010).
102. See, e.g., In re Cheney, 544 F.3d 311, 314 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that plaintiffs
had “shown no need” to depose the Vice President’s Chief of Staff when there was a
lower-level official that could be deposed and that was “more logically suited to clearing
up the lingering questions regarding” the information plaintiffs sought).
103. In re McCarthy, 636 F. App’x 142, 142 (4th Cir. 2015) (granting a writ of
mandamus to block the deposition of the EPA Administrator); Order, In re United States,
No. 14-5146, 2014 BL 398967 (D.C. Cir. July 24, 2014) (granting a writ of mandamus to
block the deposition of the USDA Secretary); In re United States, 542 F. App’x. 944, 949
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (granting a writ of mandamus to block the deposition of the Federal
Reserve Chair); In re Cheney, 544 F.3d at 314 (granting a writ of mandamus to block the
deposition of Vice President Cheney’s Chief of Staff while allowing depositions of lowerlevel staffers); In re United States, 197 F.3d 310, 316 (8th Cir. 1999) (granting a writ of
mandamus to block subpoenas directing the Attorney General and Deputy Attorney
General to testify); In re FDIC, 58 F.3d 1055, 1057, 1062–63 (5th Cir. 1995) (granting a writ
of mandamus to block the deposition of three board members of the FDIC); In re United
States, 985 F.2d 510, 511, 513 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (granting a writ of mandamus
to block a subpoena directing the FDA Commissioner to testify for a half-hour by phone).
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research turns up no court of appeals case that denies such a petition
for mandamus.
A good illustration of how district judges may come near to
making high officials testify only to be reversed upstairs is Miccosukee
Tribe of Indians of Florida v. United States,104 a challenge by a Florida
Native American tribe and environmentalists to the EPA’s failure to
stop Florida from backing off its plan to protect the Everglades
(particularly from phosphorus pollution by the sugar industry) under
the Clean Water Act.105 In the 1990s, Florida sought and obtained
EPA approval for a delay of its Clean Water Act plans, promising to
bring phosphorus in the Everglades down to its natural level by an
extended deadline of 2006.106 But between 2003 and 2005, the state,
by legislation and state agency action, put off the date further to
2016.107 The EPA concluded that Florida’s action did not alter water
quality standards and therefore did not require EPA review.108
Plaintiffs sued both the state and the EPA. In 2008, District Judge
Alan Gold granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that
parts of Florida’s action were unlawful and that it did require EPA
review, consistent with his opinion.109 The EPA then took no action
for fifteen months.110 On plaintiffs’ motion, Judge Gold issued a showcause order,111 which prompted the EPA to quickly conduct a review
and disapprove some aspects of Florida’s action.112 But Judge Gold
found that the EPA’s disapproval did not go far enough and that it
contravened his prior ruling about what Florida needed to do.113
Given the ongoing injury to the Everglades, as well as the EPA’s
delayed and inadequate response, Judge Gold imposed a new, more
specific injunction on the EPA to review Florida’s plans yet again
with a five-month deadline.114 He also ordered EPA Administrator
Lisa Jackson to “personally appear” in his courtroom on a set date six
months hence, “to report to the Court on compliance with this
104. 706 F. Supp. 2d 1296 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
105. Miccosukee Tribe, 2008 WL 2967654, at *1–2. For an excellent discussion of the
background and origins of the case, see generally Dexter Filkins, Swamped: Jeb Bush’s
Fight Over the Everglades, NEW YORKER, Jan. 4, 2016, at 32.
106. Miccosukee Tribe, 2008 WL 2967654, at *11.
107. Id. at *14–16.
108. Id. at *1.
109. Id. at *42–43.
110. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 706 F. Supp. 2d 1296,
1305 (S.D. Fla. 2010).
111. Order to Show Cause, Miccosukee Tribe, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ, ECF No. 358.
112. Miccosukee Tribe, 706 F. Supp. 2d at 1305–06.
113. Id. at 1305.
114. Id. at 1323–25.
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Order.”115 The EPA did meet the five-month deadline, and then
moved to have the Assistant Administrator for the Office of Water,
Peter Silva, who was one rung below Jackson, appear at the upcoming
compliance hearing instead of Jackson.116
Judge Gold refused, insisting he had “a right to pose direct
questions” to Jackson “regarding whether the [water protection]
strategies outlined” in the EPA’s recent review of Florida’s plans “are
a sincere commitment or merely an empty shell,”117 especially given
the major increases in funding that would be necessary to fulfill those
plans,118 presumably from both state and federal coffers. It seems
Judge Gold was not interested in technical or scientific information
about water quality but in questions about the political willingness of
the EPA to allocate and lobby for billions of dollars in funding—a
sufficiently high-level question about which the Administrator
arguably was an appropriate person to testify. Clearly, though, the
order to testify was not purely informational in purpose: it was an
effort, after years of agency resistance, to force the Everglades into a
higher place on EPA management’s agenda and perhaps to put the
Administrator in a box where she had to make some public
commitment to the Everglades’ preservation.
The government then sought a writ of mandamus from the
Eleventh Circuit, which stayed Jackson’s appearance and then within
weeks issued an opinion granting the writ.119 Judge William Pryor,
writing for a two-to-one majority, framed the question strictly in
terms of technical informational needs.120 The question was whether
the EPA’s review of Florida’s Clean Water Act compliance plan was
lawful, and Assistant Administrator Silva—not Administrator
Jackson—was the person officially responsible for the review’s
preparation.121 This made Silva “the most knowledgeable official”

115. Id. at 1324.
116. Docket Entry 460, Miccosukee Tribe, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ.
117. Miccosukee Tribe, 2010 WL 3860712, at *4, mandamus granted sub nom. In re
United States, 624 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2010).
118. See id. (noting that the “protection of the Everglades is of considerable national
importance,” finding that the case presented “extraordinary circumstances” necessitating
the “Administrator’s attendance at the hearing,” and citing to a previous order describing
the financial implications of compliance); see also Sua Sponte Order of the Court at 2,
Miccosukee Tribe, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ, ECF No. 470 (projecting compliance costs in
the billions of dollars and describing the EPA’s need for a “meaningful financing plan”).
119. In re United States, 624 F.3d 1368, 1372, 1377 (11th Cir. 2010).
120. See id. at 1373.
121. Id.
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about the agency action at issue and negated any need for Jackson to
testify instead.122
In dissent, Judge Beverly Martin, a former district judge, argued
that the case met the high standard for calling a high official to testify
because of “the extensive disobedience displayed by the EPA.”123 In
her view, the district court’s maneuver should be evaluated not in
light of its need for scientific or technical information but in light of
its need for compliance after a long period of resistance.124 The forced
appearance was less a matter of information gathering than
enforcement: “[f]aced with such recalcitrance, the [district] court
properly relied upon the long recognized inherent authority of district
courts to enforce their mandates.”125
Martin’s view, conceiving of the forced appearance more as an
enforcement weapon than an informational device, was rejected by
the majority. The EPA’s “alleged noncompliance” was simply
irrelevant to the permissibility of calling the Administrator to testify:
“[o]ur decision is not about that issue,” the majority wrote.126 If the
district judge meant to force the Everglades into a higher place on the
EPA’s agenda, that was wrong. It was improper for a judge to seek
“to determine the priorities for a high-level executive official,” an act
that “clearly encroached on the discretion vested in the executive
branch.”127 “[I]t cannot be said that the Everglades is the only matter
of national importance demanding the Administrator’s attention.”128
Appellate courts’ willingness to shield high officials from a
demand to testify—exemplified by cases like Miccosukee Tribe—may
suggest that this is not an effective weapon. But the truth is more
nuanced. For one thing, the EPA did offer up Assistant
Administrator Peter Silva to testify in Miccosukee Tribe.129 Silva was
still quite a high-ranking official—Senate confirmed, with a vast
jurisdiction.130 The appellate opinions blocking high-official testimony
generally pertain to agency heads,131 and it is not clear how frequently
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1380 (Martin, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 1379.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1376 (majority opinion).
127. Id. at 1375.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1371.
130. Id. Silva did participate in the compliance hearing when it eventually happened—
the day after breaking his wrist!—though, by then, Judge Gold had converted it to a
conference call, and Silva said little. Oral Argument at 81–84, Miccosukee Tribe of Indians
of Fla. v. United States, No. 1:04-cv-21448-WJZ (S.D. Fla. Dec. 17, 2010), ECF No. 545.
131. See supra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
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officials below that rank but still with substantial agenda-setting
power are subject to these demands.132
Agency heads themselves do not always escape demands to
testify. Though the DOJ seems to be universally successful when it
seeks mandamus on this issue, it is also famously restrained in going
to the courts of appeals, and there are some striking cases in which it
did not try to get a court of appeals to block high-official testimony.
One was the contempt trial of Interior Secretary Gale Norton in the
Native American trust account litigation in 2002, in which Norton
took the stand for three-and-a-half hours, repeatedly answering “I
don’t know” to questions from the plaintiffs’ attorney about the trust
accounts.133 Another was the litigation on USFS use of fire retardants
discussed above, in which Agriculture Undersecretary Rey traveled to
Missoula, Montana, for two days to testify before Judge Molloy,
saying “[w]e’re sorry” for the mistakes that led to his agency’s delay
and “we dropped the ball.”134 Besides Rey, testifying must also have
been burdensome and anxiety provoking for the five career officials
who had to speak at length about their agency’s mistakes and
miscommunications at their boss’s contempt hearing. Indeed, one
faced a dressing down from Judge Molloy for the agency’s “systemic
disregard of the rule of law,”135 and another was forced to say he
could not recall why he failed to keep agency counsel and the court
informed about the delay.136
It is interesting to speculate on why DOJ opted against seeking
mandamus in these cases. Within any given case, the government
must pick its battles, especially with an angry district judge.
Regarding the Native American trust account litigation, the Wall
Street Journal had written, “Justice Department lawyers defending”
132. Cf. Order at 1–2, Razeq v. Gonzalez, No. 3:07-cv-02652-JZ (N.D. Ohio Apr. 10,
2008), ECF. No. 28 (threatening to make Karyn Zarlenga, acting director of the U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services Cleveland Field Office, show up at a show-cause
hearing if action was not taken before date certain); Order at 6, Leybinsky v. Immigration
& Naturalization Serv., No. 4:00-cv-01314-MM (M.D. Pa. June 12, 2001), ECF No. 61
(ordering an Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) district director and INS
supervisory detention and deportation officer to “appear in person” at a show-cause
hearing).
133. Neely Tucker, Norton Admits Some Indian Trust Records “No Longer Exist,”
WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2002), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/2002/
02/14/norton-admits-some-indian-trust-records-no-longer-exist//f10d5af4-3db2-4833-bc47630b069b8005 [http://perma.cc/3M4Q-4NCY].
134. Transcript of Hearing on Motion for Contempt at 38, Forest Serv. Emps. for
Envtl. Ethics v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 9:03-cv-00165 (D. Mont. Feb. 26–27, 2008) (on file
with the North Carolina Law Review).
135. See id. at 129–31.
136. Id. at 200–05.
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the Interior Department “have been treading gingerly,” as Judge
Lamberth “has become the legal equivalent of volcanic Mount
Pinatubo.”137
Consistent with the idea that threats to force high-ranking
officials to show up are credible, at least sometimes, judges view such
threats as having incentive effects on official behavior in some
instances. When a district court preliminarily enjoined some of the
Obama Administration’s antideportation initiatives in 2015, the
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) subsequently issued
deferred action status to a few thousand applicants in violation of the
injunction.138 When the judge learned of this, he ordered the nameddefendant high officials (including the DHS Secretary) to attend a
show-cause hearing in person, six weeks hence.139 Before the
scheduled date of the hearing, the government submitted a brief
detailing its painstaking efforts to redress the noncompliance, some of
which had been undertaken after the court’s announcement that the
officials would have to show up in court in person.140 After receiving
this brief, the judge backed off his order that the high-ranking
officials show up,141 but he later said the government “did not
implement effective corrective measures until this Court ordered [the
agency and its officials] to actually appear in Court to explain their
inaction.”142

137. John J. Fialka, Babbitt and Rubin Face Fiery Judge on Native American TrustFund Case, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 1999), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB917484374874372500 [http://perma.cc/QU2B-7XBJ]. By the time Norton testified in
February 2002, Judge Lamberth had shown the ability to disrupt Interior Department
operations in a variety of ways, including cutting off parts of the agency from the internet.
Shane Harris, Court-Ordered Blackout Leaves Interior Employees Without Internet, Email, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Dec. 14, 2001), https://www.govexec.com/technology/2001/12/courtordered-blackout-leaves-interior-employees-without-internet-e-mail/10678 [http://perma.cc/
UX9N-7AF3] (“Lamberth’s order . . . has left most Interior employees unable to use the
Internet or send and receive e-mail to addresses outside the agency.”).
138. Order at 1–2, Texas v. United States, No. 1:14-cv-00254 (S.D. Tex. July 7, 2015),
ECF No. 281.
139. Id.
140. See Defendants’ Expedited, Unopposed Motion to Cancel August 19 Hearing or,
in the Alternative, to Excuse Secretary Johnson and Other Defendants and to Substitute
Witnesses, and Memorandum in Support at 5–21, Texas, No. 1:14-cv-00254, ECF No. 287.
The “unprecedented residential site visit program” was “initiated” on July 16, id. at 14,
which was several days after the court’s July 7 announcement of the August 19 show-cause
hearing, id. at 1.
141. Order at 1, Texas, No. 1:14-cv-00254, ECF No. 289.
142. Texas, 2016 WL 3211803, at *12 n.13 (emphasis added).
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CONCLUSION
My aims in this Essay have been to identify compliance litigation
as an important factor determining the efficacy of judicial review of
agency action generally, to show that the judge’s access to
information is the defining problem for such litigation, and to explore
how judges and litigants grapple with that problem. There is a great
deal more fruitful work that scholars can do on this subject,
particularly on the last of these three points. The research will need to
draw upon sources besides the published appellate cases that are the
traditional focus of legal scholarship. A great deal could be learned
from unpublished orders and filings gathered purposely to analyze
this topic (whereas the sources for this Essay, as noted earlier, were
gathered for a related but distinct topic, i.e., contempt, and shed light
on compliance negotiations incidentally). And yet more can be
learned from interviews with veterans of this kind of litigation in
order to understand aspects of the negotiations that leave no trace in
the official court record.

